Brexit and its implications
In the avalanche of commentary about the UK’s vote to leave the European Union, it may be that one more voice from the periphery is irrelevant. But this
decision not only has implications beyond the UK, in economic terms, it also manifests
a wider sense of disenchantment and disenfranchisement among many people in developed countries. It is therefore worth reflecting on.
There is no doubt, at the start, that the UK vote to leave the EU reflected a developing sense of xenophobia and increasingly isolationist turn among a majority of British citizens. That the UK Independence Party (UKIP) campaign which drove this issue from the outset was focused on an anti-immigration and overtly racist program underscores this point.
This is not to say that all who voted to leave the EU are racist or xenophobic, but it is to say that the imagery used by UKIP was, in some instances, closely aligned to that used by Nazi Germany in its own campaigns against ‘inferior’ foreigners. The murder of parliamentarian Jo Cox, too, appears to have been driven by an extreme right-wing ideology blended with a hefty dose of insanity, the two of which are often not very far removed.
More to the point, however, what used to be referred to as the ‘working class’ in many industrialised countries are feeling increasingly insecure as the world undergoes profound economic and technological changes. The certainties of employment, the reliance on manufacturing and the older socio-economic divisions have all begun to evaporate. This is not to suggest there does not remain a class of poor, of under-employed and of skilled and semi-skilled workers.
It is, however, to suggest that they do not see their interests in common, and that they look to different and often competing forms of representation. The decline in trade union membership being but one example of this, the fragmentation of the base of Labor/Labour Parties another.
In times of insecurity, many people look to easy answers to complex questions and, without the skills to understand the complexities, are easily drawn to populist responses. Hence there has been the rise of Donald Trump in the US, the French National Front, and the rise of far right politics in Austria, the Netherlands and elsewhere.
Historically there would have also been a rise of an alternative Leftist force, but the Left’s foundations have, as noted, been fragmenting. The political competition, such as it is, is increasingly between the moderate and often conservative middle ground and the far Right. This explains UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s opposition to the Brexit, as well as the luke-warm comments of Labor leader Jeremy Corbyn.
The Brexit will also likely wreak havoc upon the UK economy, with its loss of access to markets, the removal of London as Europe’s financial centre and a loss of faith in domestic investment. Financial instability is, of course, not exclusive to the UK and the sensitivities of the global share markets have already shown this. They will correct, but will also continue to flinch, often quite badly, at each mis-step in the UK’s management of its withdrawal from the EU. And there will be mis-steps – it is not possible to dismantle a complex economic relationship and leave all parts as strong and coherent as they previously were.
In terms of the Brexit voters, those who have lost their industrial jobs or feared doing so are unlikely to see their decision rewarded with new investment in manufacturing. Quite the opposite is to be expected. This may then explain why around three-quarters of younger voters chose to stay within the EU; they see their future as a more globalized, rather than isolationist, one.
The UK’s vote may also set a precedent for other states to leave the EU, thereby returning the collection of small countries that comprise Europe to a position of competition rather than cooperation. This is unlikely to lead to another European war, but it certainly takes away what has arguably been the best mechanism designed to ensure there would not be another such war.
Indeed, a key motivation for the EU in the first instance, following World War II, was to ensure that European states cooperated more closely, working on the logic that countries that are reliant upon one another and which are more closely integrated are less likely to form hard divisions between them.
Fortunately, France, Belgium and Germany are much less likely to leave the EU, meaning the European states that were at the centre of World War II, and the Great War, are likely to retain cooperation rather than competition.
In 2014, the people of Scotland voted in their own referendum to remain as part of the UK. The primary motivator for this vote was recognition that leaving the UK would case more harm than it could possibly deliver in benefit. Now, with the UK voting to leave the EU, it is very likely that there will be a renewed push for a new poll in Scotland as to whether it wishes to remain as part of a non-EU UK, or to secede and have the opportunity of re-joining the EU.
If so, there is a much greater likelihood that it will vote to secede. A similar vote in Northern Ireland is less likely, but also possible. The once ‘united kingdom’ might again be reduced to being just plain on England, with Wales tacked on as an afterthought.
In all, the people of the UK have participated in the most democratic way in a decision about their future. Their decision satisfies a primary urge, but perhaps without adequately understanding all of its consequences. It has a parallel with the notion that, if put to a general plebiscite, most people would vote for lower taxes AND more services, which are similarly mutually exclusive.
This then raises the question of the political classes or political elite (the word ‘elite’ deriving from the term ‘elected’). There is a great deal of alienation by non-elites with their political classes and, in many respects, this represents a profound failure on the part of those political classes to adequately represent and be of the people they are supposed to represent. This, then, represents are argument for a new leadership to arise from the disenchanted and alienated, but after the populism had shown to be a policy failure, hopefully one that has developed a coherent ideology and policy program deriving from those principles.
It also goes to the question of the nature of democracy in large, complex societies. In short, it appears that while advocating for a benevolent and enlightened dictatorship is profoundly flawed, political leaders should be those who are able to rise above the emotion and anger of populism, to outline a vision and a plan for the future and to stand for election on that basis.
This is the principle informing representative democracy, where citizens vote for those they believe best able to lead, rather than what amounts to mob rule. But for this to be effective, those representatives must be closely connected to those who they represent; they must be of them, if among their best and brightest.
For it to be otherwise is to throw up challenges to the continued existence of democracy as we know it and perhaps, as we have now just seen a mild example of, towards a new type of political organization that has the potential to develop as a 21st century iteration of populist demagoguery or, indeed, neo-fascism.