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Myanmar’s critical but uneven elections

This Sunday, Myanmar (otherwise known as Burma) will go to the polls in what will be its most critical political test for a generation. The last time Myanmar went to the polls, in 1990, the overwhelming vote in favor of the pro-reform National League for Democracy (NLD) was ignored by the military regime, which then imprisoned NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi.
This Sunday, more than 100 parties will compete for control of the two houses of parliament, which in turn elect the president. There is a widespread view that the NLD will easily be the most successful party in the elections but, ironically, it may still struggle to form government and could not choose its own leader as its presidential candidate.
The two fundamental problems that confront the NLD are that, under the 2008 constitution, a person with relatives living abroad cannot stand for president. Suu Kyi’s sons live in the UK and the restriction is widely seen as an anti-Suu Kyi measure.
The second problem is that 75 per cent of both houses of parliament is required to change the constitution. As 25 per cent of parliamentary seats are reserved for the military, it retains effective veto over constitutional change, including whether it should retain parliamentary seats or have power of veto.
Even so, the NLD is confident that it will win an absolute majority – even an overwhelming majority – in its own right. It would then use the moral force of such a win to compel the rest of parliament – and some of the military – to join it in changing the constitution. Some NLD representatives have even said in local media it expects to win 90 per cent of the vote.
The problem for the NLD is, however, that polling in key electorates shows that, in a first past the post system, the ruling military-turned-civilian Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) could win between 15 and 20 per cent of the seats. Added to a small but influential ultra-nationalist party and a swag of ethnic parties that will probably do well in their regions, the NLD might struggle to achieve a majority and, if so, will likely only do so in coalition with smaller parties.
Until last August, some in the USDP, such as lower house speaker Shwe Mann, had been talking about a coalition with the NLD – and putting himself forward as a compromise presidential candidate. Hard-liners in the USDP quickly dumped him and his followers from power, if not out of parliament. Shwe Mann may, then, come to the NLD with a break-away faction of the USDP, but still putting himself forward as the compromise presidential candidate.
While the NLD would have to consider such an option, Suu Kyi would be loathe to accept it. The NLD’s support base, too, would be deeply unhappy about any outcome that did not see the NLD dominating government and Suu Kyi as president. For many right now, emotion is running well ahead of legal restrictions.
Apart from some areas not having voting due to continuing conflict or other security concerns, problems with the voter rolls and the 40,000 ‘election police’ being largely recruited from the army-controlled militia, the election process itself has – these qualifications not withstanding – been predicted to be fairly free and fair.
With some 11000-plus local election observers (and a more modest 350 international observers) for the first time, there will be close scrutiny of voting irregularities. The real problem may lie, however, in the counting process, which is expected to take up to two weeks as the vote counting goes through layers of tabulation from the village to the national level.
Even before the voting starts, there have been complaints of irregularities. These will no doubt increase, regardless of the outcome, although the question will come down to one of evidence to support such claims.
Myanmar has been undergoing reform for the past three years and these elections are a critical step in that process. If they are successful and the outcome is generally credible then Myanmar will likely take a further step towards becoming a real democracy. It has not been that since at least 1962.
If the election outcome, however, is widely disputed and regarded as illegitimate, the range of possible outcomes could vary from a coalition imposing itself on the nation, to the election results being discarded entirely, to the military again taking control from a civilian process ‘not yet ready’ to govern.
Most likely, however, will be something in between, with a less than satisfactory process producing a questionable but possibly workable result, and further steps towards reform being put on hold for the time being. As many with an active interest in the process are wont to say, even a compromise result would be better than the current situation in neighboring Thailand, or Cambodia, Laos or Vietnam.
The problem with that comparison is, of course, that it is setting the bar for what might constitute acceptability at a very low level.