Good Governance, Accountability and Development: Aceh as a Case Study

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(These are the notes from an address to the recent International Conference on Governance and Development, Padang, Indonesia, 15 December 2010)

Good governance theory

•      Democratisation

•      = Electoral accountability

•      Requires transparency

•      = Good governance (reduced corruption, focused work, better performance)

= more effective development

Post-conflict theory

•      High expectations

•      Limited capacity

•      Lingering conflict-era organisation and approaches

•      = problematic post conflict transition

Post-Conflict Practice in Aceh:
Some positive outcomes

•      Since 2005, new democratic political system : local parties, local government, accountability

•      Development: education/technical skills, health care, economic growth

•      Jailing of corrupt former governor

•      Limits on TNI activity, ‘businesses’

… but also negatives

•      LoGA vs MOU

•      Problems with reintegration – limited funds

•      Some ineffective bupatis – low capacity

•      Central government lacks responsiveness

•      11 national bills still required to implement LoGA (8 DPR, 3 President)

•      DPRA ineffective, self-serving, very low capacity

•      59 local bills still required for LoGA

•      20 bills presented by governor

•      Only one bill discussed: Qanun Wali Nanggroe on behalf of Malik Mahmud

•      QWN executive powers contradict 2006 Stockholm agreement on democratisation of GAM/PA

•      QWN contradicts Indonesian Constitution, LoGA, MOU and Teungku Hasan di Tiro’s signed commitment to symbolic status only

•      Top down/bottom up divisions within GAM/PA, GAM/PA’s struggle for internal accountability

•      Hence retention of some conflict-era methods

… leads to increasing               disappointment

•      Some believe limited implementation = sell-out of struggle

•      Political agitation – but democratic space to allow it

•      Fragmentation of previous political loyalties = dynamic realignments

Aceh conforming to post-conflict/early democratisation type
…
but not marked by the broad post-conflict failure of some

Executive government and                               accountable development

•      Universal health care

•      Improved education, international scholarships

•      Anti-corruption campaign

•      Ban of commercial logging/protection of wildlife

Rejection of Qanun Jinayat

Self interest continues in some areas

•      Many panglimas now wealthy

•      Continuing elements of patron-client relations

•      Pressure for traditional methods of business favors and extortion (formerly pajak nanngroe)

Positives

•      Provocations overcome, TNI-police rivalry ended

•      TNI, police business diminished to near zero

•      Heightened political competition consistent with emerging plural/ democratic process

And positives around the peace

•      Presidential commitment to maintaining peace

•      Gubernatorial commitment to retaining peace

•      Re-engagement of CMI in watching brief

Aceh’s dynamic political                                         environment

•      2011 pilkada to change several poor performing bupatis

•      Conflict-era loyalties being tested

•      Governorship will be hotly contested: party vs performance?

•      2014: existing DPRA members will struggle to be re-elected

 

Consequences

•      Discontent producing continuing demands for further change

•      Some local politicians to pay the price of failure to achieve that change

•      Incentive for performance: accountability to produce better political performance, or else removal

•      Conclusion Mixed performance based on low capacity, old practices

•      Commitment by some politicians to good governance and good outcomes

•      Desire for re-election enhancing performance

•      Under-performers likely to struggle to continue

•      Political accountability arrives more slowly than is desired

•      … but it does arrive

•      Despite expected problems, the logic of accountable politics in Aceh continues to progress!

•      Successful on peace

•      Democratic consolidation?